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• BOAC’s Scandinavian Service (1939-45), which 
operated between the UK and neutral Sweden, 
provided the means by which a large number 
of Allied clandestine operations and activities 
could be carried out during the Second World 
War.
TAKEAWAYS
The BOAC Leuchars-Bromma Service 1939-1945
On 24 August 1939, the United Kingdom 
government, in conjunction with its newly 
established and publically-owned airline, the 
British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC), 
established a regular scheduled weekly 
passenger and freight air service between 
Croydon aerodrome near London and the four 
Nordic capitals with the Norwegian coastal 
city of Stavanger; it would be known as the 
Scandinavian service.
The service continued to operate, somewhat 
intermittently, after the Second World began 
until February 1941, from which time the ser-
vice was greatly expanded from a new base at 
• Moreover, its transport of thousands of tons of 
Swedish-manufactured steel ball-bearings to 
Britain during the same period, was vital for its 
aircraft manufacturing industry.
Leuchars on the east coast of Scotland, with its 
remit including the carriage of vital industrial 
supplies for British war industries, Allied re-
sistance and intelligence operatives, as well as 
much diplomatic mail, often used as cover for 
secret documents and material as well as for 
the transport of Norwegian refugees to Britain, 
many of whom would then join the Norwegian 
Armed Forces in Exile.
The Scandinavian service became increas-
ingly significant for the Allies and particularly 
so for Britain, Norway and neutral Sweden 
over the course of the war. During the period 
September 1939 to April 1940, Britain main-
The BOAC Leuchars-Bromma Service 1939-1945
© Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, Oslo 2021. ISSN 1894-4795
IFS Insights 4/2021 2
civil defence action against the missiles than 
would otherwise have been possible, undoubt-
edly saving many thousands of civilian lives and 
probably preventing serious disruption to on-
going Allied military operations in France and 
the Low Countries.
From 1942, the British aircraft manufac-
turing industry began experiencing a chronic 
shortage of steel bearings and ball-bearings 
– vital components for all aircraft as well as 
most other mechanical vehicles. Domestic 
production was already at full capacity and 
despite intermittent attempts, merchant ship-
ping could not provide the quantity needed 
from overseas, either from Sweden or other 
sources. Consequently, the Air Ministry decided 
that much of the Scandinavian service should 
be given over to priority transport of these 
products, including aboard Norwegian-owned 
BOAC aircraft for which cargo capacity charges 
were paid by the British government to their 
Norwegian counterparts. The crisis had been 
largely alleviated by late 1943, thanks to the 
BOAC service.
Throughout the war, at least 50,000 
Norwegian refugees reached Sweden, most 
of them initially being billeted in and around 
Stockholm. This situation became significant 
from a humanitarian as well as a diplomatic 
point of view. The Swedish Red Cross and 
government agencies became increasingly 
stretched in caring for the refugees and pres-
sure was put upon the Air Ministry and Foreign 
Office in London by both Stockholm and the 
Norwegian government to transport more refu-
gees to Britain, where many wished to join the 
Norwegian armed forces. 
After much argument and considerable an-
ger from the Norwegians (the government and 
the refugees themselves), increased capacity 
was allowed, with the Norwegian arm of the 
service taking the bulk of this responsibility. 
Furthermore, British and Norwegian BOAC-
carried humanitarian cargoes (including food, 
clothing and medical supplies) were sent to 
support this community. Only around one 
thousand civilians were evacuated to Britain 
by BOAC, however this figure may be some-
what misleading due to the larger number of 
Norwegian service personnel who used the 
Scandinavian service, having at one time been 
civilian refugees.
taining strong diplomatic ties and communica-
tions between London and the Nordic govern-
ments was seen as vital, not least as a counter-
weight against increasing pressure and influ-
ence from both Nazi Germany and the Soviet 
Union on those governments. Intelligence also 
inevitably became an ever more important fac-
tor as European diplomacy largely failed and 
Denmark and Norway were occupied. The ser-
vice had ceased to operate to Helsinki with the 
onset of the Soviet-Finnish War in November 
1939 thus, by April 1940, Stockholm became 
the only destination to which the service oper-
ated with the city then becoming a major hub 
for intelligence gathering as well as diplomacy 
for the Allies.
Sweden’s proximity to Germany and its 
continuing official neutrality made its capital 
an important base from which the Allies could 
monitor developments and receive information 
from northern Europe on Wehrmacht move-
ments and weapons development. From 1939, 
weapons intelligence had become a major part 
of BOAC’s transport remit, with Norwegian, 
Danish, Polish, German and Austrian agents 
all providing information and material which 
was flown to Britain for swift analysis by MI6. 
This included much information on V-2 rocket 
development as well as nuclear weapons pro-
jects. In early 1943, the Norwegian SOE team 
which had successfully halted the production 
of deuterium (or “heavy water”, required for 
Hitler’s atomic weapons programme) at a Nazi-
controlled factory in Norway had returned to 
Britain via BOAC after escaping into Sweden; 
they were thus able to quickly brief MI6 on 
their success and the operational status of the 
factory. Furthermore, in October 1943, BOAC 
acted as an emergency airlift to evacuate the 
Danish nuclear physicist, Nils Bohr to Britain 
after the Danish resistance had smuggled him 
to Sweden. Bohr was about to be arrested by 
the Gestapo in Copenhagen and, it was as-
sumed, would then be forced to work on the 
Nazi atomic weapons programme. Instead he 
became a major contributor to the Manhattan 
Project.
In July 1944, BOAC also operated multiple 
flights to and from Sweden, carrying agents 
and material related to a captured V-2 rocket, 
which had crashed in southern Sweden. The 
information gleaned from this by MI6 in Britain 
enabled much earlier mitigating offensive and 
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Information and propaganda from Allied 
countries was also carried on the service, in-
cluding recorded speeches by Norwegian and 
other Allied government members, heads of 
state and other public figures. Newspapers, 
books, educational materials, Hollywood and 
UK films and even an occasional film star were 
couriered to Stockholm.
By 1944, the service had thus acquired 
a wide remit with a broad span of responsi-
bilities, all of which assisted the Allied cause, 
with the carriage of intelligence material and 
personnel, along with steel bearings having 
the greatest importance of these duties to the 
Allies’ prosecution of the war.
The role played by BOAC’s Scandinavian 
service has been greatly under-represented in 
scholarly literature since 1945. A number of 
short public information texts were produced 
by HMSO from 1946 to ’50, which gave outlines 
of the service and its responsibilities.1 However, 
these provided only basic information material, 
without assessment of the significance of the 
service.2 The lack of detail may be attributed to 
the legal restrictions on access to documents 
relating to the service at the time. Many of the 
wartime service’s files were not opened to the 
public until 1984.
There are a very small number of recent 
books on the subject and only a modest-sized 
body of work which covers some aspects of the 
Scandinavian service, primarily through gen-
eral histories of air travel, BOAC and specific 
aircraft manufacturers and marques. In the last 
twenty-five years only two books have dealt 
with the BOAC Scandinavian service specifi-
cally; Nils Mathisrud’s recent work3 is one and 
Nilsson and Sandberg’s another4. However, 
there remain areas which merit further build-
ing upon both of these excellent accounts, par-
ticularly the intelligence background and the 
wider impact the flights had in this respect, as 
well as that of the ball-bearing transports.
This article seeks to explain the significance 
1  Merchant Airmen (account according to Air Ministry & 
produced by Ministry of Information, UK), (London: HMSO, 
1946)
2  Laboratories of the Sky (produced by Ministry of 
Information, UK), (London: HMSO, 1948)
3  Nils Mathisrud, The Stockholm Run, (Sandomierz (Poland): 
2016)
4  Lars-Axel Nilsen and Leif A. Sandberg, Blockade Runners: 
Sweden’s Lifeline in the Second World War, (Orebro 
(Sweden): Gulles Forlag, 1994)
of the British Overseas Airways Corporation’s 
wartime Scandinavian service within the broad 
context of UK-Norwegian relations, the Allied 
cause and the position of neutral Sweden, from 
1939 to 1945. It will discuss and analyse the 
background to the development of the service 
and some of the most significant contributions 
to the Allied war effort the service provided in 
terms of intelligence, industrial materials and 
diplomacy.
Origins and Beginnings
The potential of air power for military uses 
became increasingly apparent during the First 
World War. Furthermore, to a limited extent, 
potential civilian and commercial uses for air-
craft, particularly for transport purposes had 
also become clearer. By 1918, aeronautical 
technology had reached a stage where pas-
senger flights across the North Sea were viable 
from a safety point of view; thus, by 1919 the 
first attempts were being made to prove their 
commercial viability. After a somewhat falter-
ing start on both sides of the North Sea, by the 
mid-1920s, commercial air travel for both pas-
sengers and cargo was common, both domesti-
cally and internationally, although it would be 
the early 1930’s before regular, scheduled pas-
senger flights between the UK and Scandinavia 
began and a further decade before the impor-
tance of civilian air services in wartime would 
also prove able to provide great advantages to 
governments and their intelligence services.
Air passenger services, combined with 
cargo and mail flights, were operated intermit-
tently between Britain and Scandinavia from 
the late 1920s by various couriers, including 
the Swedish national carrier, Aktiebolaget 
Aerotransport (ABA)5 and British Airways Ltd 
(BAL)6, the forerunner of the British Overseas 
Airways Corporation (BOAC), from February 
1936.7 The Norwegian airline, Det Norske 
5  Brower V. York (Ed.), “Article No.7”, Aeronautical World 
News; Issue 216, Vol. V; Washington, D.C.: U. S. Department 
of Commerce , Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, 
1930) pp.244-7 
6  United Kingdom parliamentary debate, (London: Hansard/
HMSO, London, 9 December 1936): https://api.parliament.
uk/historic-hansard/commons/1936/dec/09/scandinavian-
service (accessed 23 April 2021)
7  Treasury Solicitor and H.M. Procurator General, Treasury 
Solicitor’s Department, List & Index Society, (Kew, London: 
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Luftfartselskap (DNL) began negotiations with 
BAL for a jointly run regular passenger service 
between Oslo and London in 1938, however no 
agreement was reached8 and the following year 
BAL negotiated a concession directly with the 
Norwegian government.9
The other major British international cou-
rier, Imperial Airways Ltd (IAL), amalgamated 
with BAL in 1939 to form the British Overseas 
Airways Corporation (BOAC). The new corpo-
ration was brought under government and Air 
Ministry control upon the outbreak of war,10 
along with all other British civilian air trans-
Royal Historical Society, 1979), p.318
8  Johan Nerdrum, Fugl fønix: En beretning om Det Norske 
Luftfartselskap (transl. from Norwegian): The Phoenix Bird: 
An Account of Det Norske Luftfartselskap (Oslo: Gyldendal 
Norsk Forlag, 1986), pp.105-110
9  Robin Higham, Britain’s Imperial Air Routes 1918-1939, 
(Yeovil (UK): G T Foulis & Co Ltd, 1960), p.1,766
10  “Statement of Guarantee Given by the Treasury on 24th 
January, 1947, in Pursuance of Section 16 (1) of the British 
Overseas Airways Act, 1939 and Civil Aviation Act, 1946, on 
Loans Raised by the British Overseas Airways Corporation…”; 
Ordered by the House of Commons (to be Printed 29th 
January 1947) Report “British Overseas Airways Act, 1939 
and Civil Aviation Act, 1946, (London (UK): Treasury of HM 
Government (UK), 1947)
port, with all flights to Scandinavia suspend-
ed.11 However the service was then reconvened 
on 30 November, with its home station having 
been moved from Heston-Croydon aerodrome 
to Newlands airfield at Scone, near Perth in 
Scotland, far distant from south-east England, 
which was expected to become a zone of major 
aerial combat. 12 
The British and the four Nordic govern-
ments wished to see the service continue to 
whatever extent was viable after the war had 
begun.13 The Scandinavian governments and 
Finland had all stated jointly their neutrality 
in the European war on 2 September14, but all 
also saw the advantages of continuing civilian 
11  J. Paul Hodgson, Britain’s Glorious Aircraft Industry: 100 
Years of Success, Setback and Change, (Barnsley: Pen & 
Sword, 2021), p.65
12  Jan Forsgren, The Junkers Ju52 Story (Stroud (UK): Fonthill 
Media, 2016), p.67
13  Roy Reginald Roadcap (Ed.), Untitled short report, (no 
author stated), World Airline Record, (Chicago, Il: R. R. 
Roadcap, 1972), p.297
14  Earl F. Ziemke, Command Decisions, Vol. II: The German 
Decision to Invade Norway and Denmark, (Washington, 
D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, U.S. 
Department of Defense, 1990), p.50
The British Embassy, Stockholm (1939-67)
The building became a wartime hive of Allied intelligence activity and resistance planning with 
operations reaching across Scandinavia and Germany.  BOAC provided an important air-link from 
the embassy (via nearby Bromma airport) with MI6 and SOE headquarters in Britain.
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air services with both Britain and Germany, 
primarily for diplomatic and trade purposes, 
whilst the British government’s initial and pri-
mary motivation was the intelligence value of 
an ongoing civil air service between the UK and 
the Nordic capital cities, particularly in view 
of the anticipated disruption to marine traffic. 
The North Sea had become a greatly hazardous 
route for all forms of shipping for both belliger-
ent and neutral powers from the very begin-
ning of the war due, in particular, to the pres-
ence and abilities of submarines; an air conduit 
was a way to mitigate this problem.
During the winter of 1939-40, BOAC’s 
Scandinavian service operated five medium-
sized passenger aircraft: a Lockheed Electra 
10, a Lockheed Super Electra 1415, and three 
Junkers 52’s.16 The service, which used what 
was termed “Route 730”, was meant to take in 
all the Nordic capitals as well as the strategical-
ly important coastal city of Stavanger, 17on the 
south-west coast of Norway, although this was 
not always the case because of weather-related 
dangers and security concerns relating to near-
by military activity. However, the British lega-
tions in both Oslo and Stockholm in particular, 
continued to build up their espionage activities, 
sending agents and material back and forth to 
Britain in increasing volume. 
By early 1940, MI6’s growing presence in 
Stockholm allowed for the development of a 
control station for an extensive Allied intel-
ligence network across northern Europe, as a 
result of which, German military and industrial 
activity could be increasingly closely moni-
tored.18 Furthermore, the Swedish iron ore 
and steel industries were of vital importance 
to both the Allies and Axis war industries, and 
would become more so as the war progressed 
and trade arrangements with other countries 
were cut off as a result of military action. 
Although transport of air cargoes of finished 
steel goods would not begin in earnest until 
1942, both the British and the Swedes saw the 
opportunity for trade delegations, commer-
15  Joan Bradbrooke (Ed.), feature article (no author stated), 
Journal of the Royal Aeronautical Society
 (London: Royal Aeronautical Society, 1966, p.264
16  Bradbrooke (Ed.), p.264
17  Forsgren, p.67
18  Nigel West, MI6: British Secret Intelligence Service 
Operations, 1909-45, (New York: Random House, 1983), 
p.122
cial mail and technical samples to be carried 
between Britain and Sweden in the same way 
as had been conducted between Sweden and 
Germany from the late 1920s.
Despite resuming in late November 1939, 
the 730 service was again interrupted by the 
Soviet attack on Finland on 30th, during which, 
a BOAC aircraft approaching the Finnish coast 
was ordered to return to Bromma-Stockholm 
after being informed that Helsingfors 
(Helsinki) Airport 19was being attacked by 
Soviet aircraft. However, services continued to 
operate to the other Nordic capitals until the 
invasions of Denmark and Norway on 9 April 
194020, despite the evident dangers and the 
seeming imminence of war spreading through 
the entire region. This demonstrates the impor-
tance of the service to its facilitators, despite its 
small scale. By this time the service had already 
become of great importance to Britain’s Secret 
Intelligence Services (SIS), which had first re-
ceived clear intelligence about developments in 
the Nazi rocket programme in early November 
‘39, via a German scientist working for the 
Allies in Oslo, Dr Hans Ferdinand Mayer.21 
A third interruption to BOAC’s Scandinavian 
service began on 9 April when Denmark and 
Norway were first attacked by Nazi Germany. 
All flights were immediately suspended, leav-
ing one aircraft stranded in Oslo. The following 
day BOAC lost this aircraft, a Junkers, named 
‘Jason’, whilst it was parked at Fornebu aero-
drome as German troops overran the area22; yet 
Norwegian defences held long enough for the 
crew and most of the dozen BOAC ground staff 
in Oslo to escape into Sweden, with the help of 
Norwegian civilians. One of the escapees was 
the ‘Jason’s’ pilot, Captain Gilbert Rae, who 
would become one of BOAC’s most successful 
pilots on the Leuchars-Stockholm route from 
when this was established in 1941.23
A similar situation to that at Fornebu oc-
curred at Sola aerodrome near Stavanger; 
although no BOAC aircraft were present, the 
company staff fled the site; most escaping by 
19  Forsgren, p.68
20  Kenneth Hudson & ‎Julian Pettifer, Diamonds in the Sky: A 
Social History of Air Travel, (London: The Bodley Head Ltd, 
1979), p.115
21  Anthony Cave Brown, “C”: The Rise and Fall of Sir Stewart 
Graham Menzies, (London: Macmillan, 1988), p.523
22  Produced by Ministry of Information (UK), Miscellaneous 
Publications, Vol. VII, (London: HMSO, 1945), p.191 
23  Ibid.
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boat to England, whilst several others, as well 
as the British consul to Stavanger, reached 
Sweden with the help of Norwegian civilians 
and the military.24 The company’s remaining 
estate in Norway was then taken over, primar-
ily by the Wehrmacht but with some assets 
coming under the jurisdiction of the German 
national civilian airline, Deutsche Luft Hansa 
(DLH). The fact that a number of BOAC staff 
based in Norway had reached Sweden made it 
considerably easier for the company’s opera-
tions at Bromma to be expanded the following 
year. 
BOAC had perennial problems with retain-
ing and recruiting both aircrew and ground 
staff of all types throughout the war, much due 
to the demands of the military air services.25 
This situation would be improved to some 
extent by the growing number of Norwegians 
recruited to the service from 1940, although 
a large number of Norwegian civil airline em-
ployees were coerced into working for the 
German military administration in Norway, 
not least in order to prevent them leaving the 
country and thus using their abilities to assist 
the Allies. Furthermore, unlike its British oppo-
site number, the German national carrier, DLH 
did not encounter serious staff shortages, with 
the German civil aviation industry and air links 
to surrounding countries having already been 
well-established by the late 1920s.
DLH had run regular joint-passenger and air 
services between Berlin and Sweden from its 
foundation in 1926, using primarily Bulltofta 
airport near the city of Malmö in southern 
Sweden.26 From 1928, fast trains would then 
take passengers to the Swedish capital27, some 
four hundred miles to the north. Lindaränge 
marine airport served as Stockholm’s air sta-
tion from 1919 and began international com-
mercial flight services in 1924;28 yet by the 
24  Arthur Henson Narracott, Unsung Heroes of the Air, 
(London: F. Muller Ltd, 1943), p.33 
25  Higham, p.15
26  A. W. Childs (Acting Chief, Automotive Division), “Foreign 
Market Surveys, Fourth Quarter, 1928”, (Reports from 
American Representatives of the Foreign Consular Officers 
& Department of Commerce: Countries), Daily Consular 
and Trade Reports, (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Foreign & 
Domestic Commerce, 26 March 1929) p.753
27  European Finance (Trade Reports Section), “Sweden” 
(no author stated), Vol. 13: (Ann Arbor (MI): University of 
Michigan, 1929), p.161
28  Leonard Beckmann (Ed.), Exxon Air World, Vol. VI, (New 
York: Exxon, 1952), p.143
mid-1930s it no longer had the capacity or 
facilities to meet the growing demand for air 
travel. However, the establishment of a new 
airport at Bromma in 1936 on the outskirts of 
Stockholm, with a modern concrete runway 
and situated only five miles from the city cen-
tre, created the opportunity to get German and 
Swedish personnel, as well as goods and mail 
in and out of the country more quickly and 
efficiently29, as well as with lesser chance of 
identification or interception by foreign agents 
enroute than had previously been the case.
DLH moved their Swedish regional head-
quarters from Malmö to Bromma on 17 April 
193930, continuing to run services between 
Berlin and the new Swedish airport31, despite 
the onset of war. The fact that BOAC did the 
same, then provided a counterweight to the 
intelligence, diplomatic and economic purposes 
of the Berlin-Stockholm service.
Despite maintaining a skeleton service 
throughout 1940, BOAC found it difficult to re-
establish regular flights to Sweden until early 
1941. The company’s two remaining Junkers 
52 aircraft were permanently withdrawn 
from Route 730 and transferred to the RAF 
for training use in April 1940. Their continued 
deployment was considered too likely to cause 
a “friendly fire” incident as a result of being 
German-designed and in light of the chang-
ing situation in Scandinavia and increasing air 
activity by the Luftwaffe over Britain.32 Plans 
to re-start regular services to Sweden-only 
were then further hampered when BOAC lost 
one of its only two remaining 730-assigned 
aircraft, the Lockheed Electra 14, on 22 April 
1940 in fog over Loch Lomond, whilst on a do-
mestic courier flight from its base near Perth 
to Croydon.33 This left the service with only a 
29  “Stockholm den 2 September” (No author stated) (in 
Swedish) in Industriell teknik (transl.: Industrial Technology), 
Vol. 65, (Stockholm: Svenska uppfinnareföreningen : Tekniska 
läroverkens ingenjörsförbund (transl: Swedish Inventors’ 
Association: The Swedish Association of Technical Educators, 
1936), p.285
30  United Kingdom Civil Service, “Economic Conditions 
in Sweden”, (London: produced and published by UK 
Department of Overseas Trade, 1939), p.82
31  Len Cacutt (Ed.), The World’s Greatest Aircraft, (Guildford 
(UK): Colour Library Books, 1988), p.30
32  Charles Woodley, BOAC: An Illustrated History, (Cheltenham 
(UK): The History Press, 2004), p.20
33  Accident description for G-AKFD at the Aviation Safety 
Network: https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.
php?id=19400422-0 (accessed 24 April 2021)
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single aircraft.
Despite the sparsity of services to Bromma, 
BOAC did however, attempt to aid the British 
land forces operating in central Norway in 
May 1940, yet this was a costly failure and 
highlighted the great risks that future missions 
would take when flying unarmed aircraft close 
to hostile territory. Two BOAC Sunderland 
flying boats on temporary secondment to 
the RAF were sent overnight from Sumburgh 
Head in the Shetlands with supplies for the 
Allied Expeditionary Force (AEF) on 5-6 May.34 
Although the crews and some radio equip-
ment intended for the British Army at Harstad 
was saved, both aircraft were attacked and 
destroyed by the Luftwaffe, whilst at anchor 
near Bodø.35 The crews eventually made it to 
Sweden with assistance from the Norwegian 
military.36 
The Scandinavian service hub had moved 
from Heston to Newlands airport at Scone, near 
Perth in October 1939.37 Flights between Perth 
and Bromma were intermittent and occasional 
through the summer of 1940, using a single 
Lockheed Electra 14 aircraft with two aircrew 
and a supporting ground staff contingent from 
Britain, Norway and Poland.38 The small air-
craft had an excellent safety record39 and was 
favoured by diplomats and statesmen for this 
reason and for its general reliability.40 However, 
with capacity for only twelve passengers41 and/
or a small cargo of up to 5,000 lbs42 (much of it 
usually mail in the early stages of the service43) 
it was well below the capacity needed by vari-
34  John Evans, The Sunderland Flying-boat Queen, Vol. I, 
(Pembroke Dock (UK): Paterchurch, 1987), p.7
35  Imperial War Museum: Royal Air Force: Operations 
in Norway, April-June 1940: https://www.iwm.org.uk/
collections/item/object/205183669 (accessed 30 March 
2021)
36  Frederick Thomas Jane, Jane’s Fighting Aircraft of World War 
II, (Teddington (UK): Crescent Books 1989), p.139
37  Captain Dacre Watson, “British Overseas Airways 
Corporation 1940 – 1950 and its Legacy”, Journal of 
Aeronautical History, Paper No. 2013/03136, (London: Royal 
Aeronautical Society, 2013), p.8
38  Robin Higham, Speedbird: The Complete History of BOAC, 
(London: Taurus, 2013), p.29
39  René J. Francillon, Lockheed Aircraft Since 1913, (Annapolis 
(MD): Naval Institute Press, 1987), pp.137-8
40  David Owen, Anti-Submarine Warfare: An Illustrated History, 
(Barnsley: Seaforth, 2007), p.78
41  C. G. Grey & ‎Leonard Bridgman, Jane’s All the World’s 
Aircraft, (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Company
 1939), p.25 
42  Rene J. Francillon, Lockheed Aircraft since 1913, p.87
43  Hodgson, p.39
ous government departments in Whitehall 
as well as by the British and Norwegian lega-
tions in Stockholm with the former44, by this 
time being used by MI6 and SOE to gather vast 
amounts of intelligence on activity in German-
controlled territory.45 Yet there was little initial 
idea within the Air Ministry or the Norwegian 
authorities about how to expand the service, 
nor a particular appetite to do so in London 
whilst the moment of supreme decision for 
Britain was in the balance during the summer 
of 1940. Nevertheless, the fact that the service 
continued through the months of invasion 
threat, despite chronic RAF pilot shortages 
and the great need for transport aircraft both 
in Britain, North Africa and the Middle East, 
highlights the importance of its continuance, at 
least to the British and to some extent the im-
portance Britain attached to its relations with 
Norway. The Norwegian merchant fleet was 
delivering critical supplies of aviation fuel to 
Britain during the summer of 1940.
By late 1940, although aircraft were becom-
ing more plentiful, air crew remained in very 
short supply, despite the influx of pilots from 
outside Britain.46 Over 1,500 RAF pilots had 
been killed in the Battle of Britain,47 as well as 
some three hundred ground crew.48 Against 
this background, BOAC’s civilian service was 
not regarded as a high priority, despite grow-
ing recognition in Whitehall of its importance, 
evidenced in part by its hub being moved from 
Heston to sparsely populated rural Perthshire 
in the autumn of 1939.49 
The Scandinavian service had already 
proven to be important to the intelligence com-
munity, particularly with the arrival of clear 
evidence of a Nazi rocket programme via the 
British embassy in Oslo in November 1939,50 
44  Higham, Speedbird, pp.29-30
45  C. G. McKay, From Information to Intrigue: Studies in Secret 
Service, (Abingdon (UK): Routledge, 1993), p.179
46  Mitch Peeke, 1940: The Battles to Stop Hitler, (Barnsley: Pen 
& Sword, 2015), p.15
47  Stephen Bungay, The Most Dangerous Enemy: A History of 
the Battle of Britain, (London: Aurum Press, 2000), p.368
48  “Battle of Britain, Royal Air Force”, from: https://www.raf.
mod.uk (accessed 01/05/21)
49  Watson, p.8
50  Karthick Nambi, “A 7-page report which saved millions of 




(accessed 2 May 2021)
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yet recruiting staff continued to be a signifi-
cant challenge in the light of demands for the 
service to be expanded by the British legation 
in Stockholm and the Norwegian government 
in London. Yet with the ongoing arrival of 
Norwegian air and ground crew in Britain, after 
escaping from Norway, whilst others completed 
their training in Ontario, in tandem with the 
receding danger of invasion at the end of 1940, 
a solution began to present itself. Negotiations 
began between the Norwegian, Swedish and 
British governments to establish a well-re-
sourced, regular and frequent UK-Scandinavia 
air service, although there were many sticking 
points, not least the suitability of the Newlands 
BOAC base near Perth and where it might be 
moved to.
Newlands airfield had opened in 1936, 
under the control of RAF 51 Group, as an 
Elementary Flying Training School.51 However, 
with the expansion of pilot training being an 
immediate priority from 1939, from that time 
on, there was little accommodation avail-
able at the airfield for civilian staff and that 
which was is described as: ‘rudimentary and 
limited’.52 The nearby city of Perth, some four 
miles to the south, was already overcrowded 
with billeted Royal and Merchant Navy crews53. 
Furthermore, the position of the base made for 
an uneconomic use of fuel as well as an added 
danger in having to fly over the often foggy 
Scottish Highlands in travelling to and from 
Stockholm. BOAC had already lost one of its 
precious few Route 730 aircraft in such condi-
tions and air accidents were becoming more 
frequent as the skies became busier with inex-
perienced training pilots and expanding offen-
sive, as well as defensive air operations against 
a background of deteriorating winter weather.
51  Andrew Self, “RAF Scone – Rudimentary but Very 
Important”, Aviation Trails, 3 November 2019, https://
aviationtrails.wordpress.com/2019/11/03/raf-scone-
rudimentary-but-very-important/ (accessed 2 May 2021)
52  https://aviationtrails.wordpress.com/2019/11/03/raf-scone-
rudimentary-but-very-important/ 
 3 November 2019 (accessed 2 May 2021)
53  William W. J. Knox, “A History of the Scottish People: the 
Scottish Educational System 1840-1940”, p.7 from: https://
www.scran.ac.uk › scotland › pdf (accessed 2 May 2021)
Regular and Expanding Services, 1941-44
With the availability of Norwegian crews who 
were experienced in the flying conditions 
of northern Europe and the growing impor-
tance of the service for economic as well as 
diplomatic and intelligence purposes, a new 
base was eventually established adjacent to 
RAF Leuchars on the east coast of Scotland 
in February 1941.54 The service also received 
new aircraft, four Lockheed Lodestars in the 
spring of 1941, paid for by the Norwegian 
Government-in-Exile (NGE)55 along with their 
Norwegian crews.56 
The service steadily expanded over the fol-
lowing two years, in terms of numbers of air-
craft assigned and a growing portfolio of cargo 
and passenger responsibilities,57 but often 
faced repeated delays due to poor weather58, 
lack of available aircraft59 (often due to main-
tenance issues)60 and became the subject of 
much antagonism between the British and 
Norwegian authorities at governmental level, 
particularly in regard to the limits placed 
upon the NGE’s authority to negotiate for the 
purchase of US-built aircraft. After a series of 
heated arguments and complaints from the 
Norwegian Air Force Command, which had 
responsibility for the Norwegian BOAC crews, 
controls were steadily removed by the UK 
Foreign Office and Air Ministry, with the last 
limitations being abandoned in 1944.61 
By 1943 there were some 17,000 
Norwegian refugees in Stockholm62, most of 
whom wished to travel to Britain, including 
54  Camille Allaz, History of Air Cargo and Airmail from the 18th 
Century, (London: Christopher Foyle Publishing in association 
with The Air Cargo Association, 2005), p.163
55  Phil Butler & Dan Hagedorn, Air Arsenal North America: 
Aircraft for the Allies 1938-1945: Purchases and Lend-lease, 
(Shepperton (UK): Midland, 2004), p.23
56  Wilhelm Mohr, “The Contribution of the Norwegian Air 
Forces” in Patrick Salmon (Ed.), Britain and Norway in the 
Second World War, London: HMSO, 1995), p.95
57  “BOAC General Reports on Services”, Air Britain: https://ab-
ix.co.uk › pdfs › AMIL-BOAC-Gen-rep (accessed 23/04/21)
58  Robert J Laplander, The True Story of the Wooden Horse, 
(Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2014), p.231
59  Edward Bishop, The Mosquito: The Wooden Wonder (New 
York: Ballantine Books, 1971), p.53 
60  Philip Birtles, Mosquito: A Pictorial History of the DH98, 
(Coulsdon (UK): Jane’s, 1980), p.97
61  The Board of Trade Journal, Vol. 151, Issue 2,520, (London: 
HMSO, December 1945), p.622
62  “News from Sweden”, Vol. 94, (New York: American Swedish 
News Exchange, Inc., 1943), p.4 
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many who wished to join the Norwegian armed 
forces in the UK.63 From a Norwegian point of 
view, both in Britain and Sweden, this was the 
priority, yet for British authorities a multitude 
of new priorities were developing as well as 
the expansion of its existing ones, the most 
important one becoming the carriage of steel 
ball bearings and other finished steel goods for 
the British aircraft manufacturing industry.64
Various commercial agreements were 
eventually reached and adjusted from time 
to time between the Norwegian and British 
governments between 1942 and early 1944, 
so that the service was essentially spilt into 
two – one crewed and paid for by the NGE, 
the other by the British, with each deciding 
its own priorities concerning carriage and the 
British paying the NGE for space they wanted 
for cargo or passengers on Norwegian-owned 
BOAC aircraft.65 However, officials from the 
War Ministry would monitor all incoming 
63  “News of Norway”, Vol. 2, (Embassy of Norway: Washington, 
D.C., 1943), p.108
64  Malcolm Fife, Scottish Aerodromes of the 1920s and 1930s, 
(Brimscombe (UK): Fonthill Media, 2020), p.118
65  Mohr in Salmon (Ed.), p.95
and outgoing cargoes and could commandeer 
Norwegian-crewed and owned aircraft for 
British priorities, provided the Norwegian 
government was compensated for use of their 
aircraft. This practice became increasingly 
common as the British need for steel bearings 
became ever greater in 1943.
Between 1943 and 1945, BOAC transported 
some five and a half thousand tons of steel ball-
bearings from Sweden to the UK,66 whereas 
seaborne imports of ball-bearings from Sweden 
to Britain were intermittent and required 
highly dangerous journeys which amounted 
primarily to a handful of shipping operations, 
carried out months apart, by flotillas of three 
or four small armed merchant ships at a 
time, such as the MS Gay Viking (usually able 
to carry no more than forty or fifty tons of 
cargo67) which brought several hundred tons 
66  Eric B. Golson, “Did Swedish ball bearings keep the Second 
World War going? Re-evaluating neutral Sweden’s role”, 
Scandinavian Economic History Review, Vol.60, Issue 2; 
(Germantown (NY): Taylor & Francis, 2012), p.69, from: 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03585522.2
012.693259 (accessed 28 April 2021)
67  Richard Carr, “The Blockade Runners”, Richard Carr’s 
Paxman History Pages, (Colchester (UK): Davey, Paxman & 
A V-2 rocket on a trellawagen, western Europe, 1944-5
With a speed of up to 3,500mph, a range of 200 miles and carrying a one ton explosive warhead, 
the V-2 had the potential to cause widespread death and destruction in Britain, France and the 
Low Countries, as well as disruption to the preparations for, and execution of Operation Overlord.
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of bearings to the UK over the same two year 
period. The total amount of ball-bearings 
imported by air and sea combined, amounted 
to 31% of Britain’s supply,68 the greatest 
proportion of which was by air. 
The transit of steel bearings and ball-
bearings in particular from Sweden to Britain 
was of great importance to the British aircraft 
industry. By 1942, such was the shortage of 
bearings that hundreds of Lancaster bombers 
as well as other aircraft types were laying in 
fields next to the factories, incomplete because 
of the shortages.69 Furthermore, the Swedes 
were being placed under increasing pressure 
to end or reduce their equivalent trade with 
Germany in favour of the Allies.70 However, if 
the Allies were without the means to transport 
the bearings, the agreements reached with the 
Swedes to limit the trade with Germany, whilst 
increasing it with the Allies became largely 
worthless. Furthermore, German pressure 
was being placed upon the Swedes and not 
only through diplomatic means, but also with 
military threats as well as directly against the 
730 service. Through 1943 and ’44, BOAC lost 
eight aircraft, six of them to probable shoot 
downs from German aircraft and ground fire, as 
well as ten air crew and eighteen passengers.71
By 1944, the critical bearings shortages 
were being overcome, yet there was still a great 
urgency to out-purchase and out-transport the 
bearings being acquired by Germany, which 
was able to use sea transport over a short 
German-controlled sea lane of only about one 
hundred miles. The journey from Stockholm to 
Leuchars was some eight hundred miles. 
After much negotiation between the 
British and Swedish governments, in October 
agreement was reached with Stockholm to end 
Co of Colchester, 19 December 2020), from: https://www.
paxmanhistory.org.uk/sitemap.htm (accessed 26 April 2021)
68  Golson, p.3
69  Thomas J. Griffith , An Application Of The Principles Of War 
To The Schweinfurt Raids On 17 August 1943 and 14 October 
1943, (Lucknow: Lucknow Books, 2014), p.128
70  William Z. Slany, “U.S. Interagency Report on U.S. and Allied 
Wartime and Post Post-war Relations and Negotiations with 
Argentina, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey on Looted 
Gold and German External Assets” in American University 
International Law Review, Vol. XIV, Issue 1, Article 8, 
(Washington D.C.: American International Law Review, 1998), 
p.xliii, from: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1302&context=auilr (accessed 26 
April 2021)
71  Higham, pp.29-30
its export trade altogether with Germany72, 
allowing the Allies to import the remaining 
stocks not required for Swedish domestic 
industry. The price included large increases 
in rubber and oil exports from the US and 
Britain to Sweden,73 as well as defence materiel, 
including advanced aerial radar equipment; 
one such apparatus was installed by the 
British Army on the Swedish island of Öland 
in the southern Baltic in October 1944, from 
where incoming missiles and other aircraft 
could be detected.74 Both the British Army 
technical staff and the equipment were flown 
to Sweden by BOAC.75 This was a serious 
breach of Sweden’s neutrality, carried out 
entirely at Stockholm’s request and with its 
co-operation and demonstrates the importance 
to the Allies of stopping the bearing export 
trade with Germany and also that BOAC was 
able to provide a means by which Sweden’s 
price for its full co-operation could be met. 
The consequent shortage in Germany delayed 
developments of new aircraft in particular, 
which had threatened to do great damage 
and delay, or even halt Allied progress toward 
defeating Nazi Germany.76
Advanced Weapons Intelligence
Clandestine Allied operations in northern 
Europe, supported by BOAC were, in some 
cases, arguably, even more important to the 
Allies than the aforementioned trade arrange-
ments. MI6 had learned a great deal about 
German weapons plans and testing through 
its base in Stockholm: spoken and written ac-
counts, sketches, photographs and technical 
parts of such weapons, most notably the V-2 
rocket being developed at Peenemunde on the 
72  Alf W. Johansson & Torbjorn Norman, “The Swedish Policy of 
Neutrality in Historical Perspective” in International Review 
of Military History, (Leiden (Netherlands): Brill, 1984), p.112
73  H.R. 3662, U.S. Holocaust Assets Commission Act of 1998 
(Washington D.C.: United States Congress & Committee on 
Banking and Financial Services, 1998), p.112
74  Poul Grooss, The Naval War in the Baltic, 1939–1945, 
(Barnsley (UK): Pen & Sword, 2017), p.220
75  “British signal reconnaissance from Ottenby on Öland during 
the years 1944 and 1945”, from: http://www.signalspaning.
se/ottenby/index.html (accessed 25 March 2021)
76  R.G.S. Bidwell, “An Approach to Military History” in Military 
Review, , Vol. 29, Issue 6; 
 (Fort Leavenworth (KS): U.S. Command & General Staff 
College, 1949), p.107
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north German coast, had all passed through 
the British embassy on their way to Britain 
via BOAC from across northern Europe.77 
Consequently, from 1942 the Allied intelligence 
picture of the development of the V-2 ballistic 
missile, previously hazy at best, despite the 
1939 Oslo Report reaching Britain via BOAC 
in 1939, became much clearer. Polish agents 
provided sketches of the Peenemunde site78, 
Danish agents sent undeveloped photographic 
film79 and Norwegian, German and Austrian 
agents provided regular updates on technical 
and scientific developments.808182 Much of this 
information came to the Assistant Directorate 
of Intelligence (Science) (ADI Sci.), a division of 
77  Ben Wheatley, British Intelligence and Hitler’s Empire in the 
Soviet Union, (London: Bloomsbury, 2017, p.86
78  Jerzy B. Cynk, The Polish Air Force at War: 1943-1945, 
(Official History, Vol. II) (Atglen (PN): Schiffer Military History, 
1998), p.468
79  Keith Jeffery, MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence 
Service 1909-1949, (London: Bloomsbury, 2010), p.513
80  Ulf Uttersrud, “Etterretningsoffiser og militær organisator” 
(transl. from Norwegian: “Intelligence officers and Military 
Organisation”); (Oslo University College: 15 November 2007), 
from: https://web.archive.org/web/20071115011516/
http://www.iu.hio.no/~ulfu/historie/tronstad/krigen.html 
(accessed 23 April 2021)
81  R.V. Jones, Air Scientific Intelligence Report No. 7: “The 
Edda Revisited”, 17 July 1940, Churchill Archives Centre, 
Cambridge University, Reginald Victor Jones Papers, RVJO 
B.24
82  Philip Ball, Serving the Reich: The Struggle for the Soul of 
Physics under Hitler, (University of Chicago Press: 2014), 
p.138
MI6, via BOAC from Stockholm83 and was fur-
ther augmented and confirmed as accurate by 
intelligence from Allied agents in France84and 
the Low Countries, some of whom had worked 
at Peenemunde and its attendant facilities.85
The Nazi nuclear weapons programme was 
also a major concern and the level of progress 
made was unknown to the Allies until the end 
of the war. In February 1943, a Norwegian SOE 
team had successfully destroyed much of the 
production facilities at a Nazi-controlled Norsk 
Hydro fertiliser plant in the Telemark region 
of Norway, which was producing Deuterium 
Oxide or “Heavy Water”, an important element, 
required for the programme.86 All of the team 
survived, with those members who had been 
ordered to escape into Sweden all successfully 
doing so, after which they were swiftly trans-
ported back to Britain on board a Norwegian-
crewed BOAC Lodestar87, and were thus able 
to brief MI6 on the situation and advise on 
further actions. The importance of getting the 
team to Britain quickly was not only important 
83  Winston Ramsey “The V-Weapons: Then and Now” in 
After the Battle, Issue 6, (Old Harlow (UK): Battle of Britain 
International Ltd, 1977), p.19
84  Martyn Cornick & Peter Morris, The French Secret Services, 
(Santa Barbara (CA): ABC-Clio, 1993), p.66
85  Graeme Cook, Missions Most Secret, (Blandford: Harwood-
Smart, 1976), p.101
86  Margaret Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939-1947, 
(New York: St Martin’s Press, 1964), p.229
87  Oliver, p.218
A Norwegian BOAC Lockheed Lodestar at Leuchars, c.1943
Four Lockheed Model 18 Lodestars were the mainstay of the Norwegian crewed element of the Scan-
dinavian service until early 1943.  They were replaced by larger aircraft as the facilities at both Leuchars 
and Bromma were enlarged.
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from MI6’s point of view. The men’s personal 
safety was in jeopardy whilst they remained 
in Sweden because of the presence of Abwehr 
and undercover Gestapo agents in the coun-
try. Their capture could also have endangered 
their colleagues who had remained in Norway 
and other operatives. Furthermore, Sweden 
itself was still under threat of attack by Nazi 
Germany if it did not comply with Hitler’s wish-
es. The evacuation of the team would not be the 
only time BOAC provided somewhat dramatic 
proof of its importance to the Allies.
The Danish nuclear physicist, Nils Bohr was 
smuggled out of Denmark ahead of the imposi-
tion of martial law in the country on 6 October 
1943 and was immediately taken to Britain 
in the bomb-bay of a BOAC Mosquito.88 The 
Danish resistance had learned that his arrest 
was imminent,89 after which it was presumed 
that he would be forced to work for the Nazi 
nuclear weapons programme. Bohr had suc-
cessfully identified the chemical compound, 
Vanadium 235:90 ‘a vital ingredient of what 
became the nuclear fission atomic bomb.’ 91 His 
considerable contribution to the Manhattan 
project is unquestioned.92
By mid-1943 the Allied intelligence pic-
ture on the V-2 which, it was presumed would 
carry a nuclear warhead once the latter was 
manufactured, had developed to the point 
where both Churchill and the head of RAF 
Bomber Command, Air Chief Marshal Arthur 
Harris were persuaded to sanction a major raid 
on the main Nazi rocket development site at 
Peenemunde on the Baltic island of Usedom on 
17-18 August. The raid resulted in the rocket 
programme being set back by about three 
months.93 This amount of time might seem 
unworthy of the effort at first glance, in par-
ticular in view of the loss of life involved – over 
two hundred RAF aircrew94 and at least five 
hundred slave labourers, yet only a handful of 
88  Patrick Delaforce, The Fourth Reich and Operation Eclipse, 
(Stroud (UK): Fonthill, 2015), p.282
89  Joseph I. Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula: The 
Struggle to Control Atomic Weapons, 1945-49, 
 (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1970), p.17
90  Delaforce, p.282
91  Delaforce, p.282
92  Herman Feshbach & Tetsuo Matsu (Eds.), Niels Bohr: Physics 
and the World, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), p.362
93  Martin Middlebrook, The Peenemunde Raid, (London: 
Penguin, 1998), p.222
94  Middlebrook, p.210
rocket engineers and scientists were killed.95 
Whether it was or not a price worth paying is 
not adjudged here, however the delay in de-
velopment meant that the V-2 was not ready 
for deployment prior to D-Day. Had it been, it 
could have been used to cause great damage 
and disruption to preparations for Operation 
Overlord on the south coast of England and to 
the Normandy invasion itself.
The most significant intelligence coup re-
garding rocket intelligence resulted from the 
apparently accidental crash of a test fired V-2 
missile (partly intact) in southern Sweden on 
13 June 1944.96 MI6 swiftly learned of the crash 
and successfully negotiated with the Swedes 
for their intelligence findings on the rockets 
and for the rocket itself to be transported to 
Britain97 where most of its significant features 
were established or confirmed by Dr R. V. Jones 
of ADI (Sci.).98 
BOAC provided the transport for the British 
intelligence officers, who carried out their own 
investigation in Sweden, and the means by 
which they were brought back to Britain with 
key parts of the rocket in mid-July.99 BOAC also 
negotiated with the USAAF for the use of an 
American civilian aircraft that then brought 
back the fuselage of the rocket at the end of 
the month. 100 The C-47 Skytrain aircraft used 
for the mission was made up of British and 
Norwegian BOAC crew as well as US service 
personnel, including Colonel Bernt Balchen, 
who commanded the mission and piloted the 
aircraft.101 Balchen was a Norwegian-American 
with a great wealth of flying experience in 
Nordic climates, including having a number 
of pioneering aviation successes to his name. 
His selection for the mission goes some way in 
demonstrating the importance of its success.
Dr Jones at ADI was able to provide a full 
95  Middlebrook, pp. 243–244
96  Michael J. Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemunde 
and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era, (Washington, 
D.C.: Smithsonian, 2013), p.237
97  William B. Breuer, Race to the Moon: America’s Duel with 
the Soviets, (Westport (CT): Praeger, 1993), p.48
98  Dieter K. Huzel, Peenemünde to Canaveral, (Englewood Cliffs 
(NJ): Prentice Hall, 1960), p. 93
99  R.V. Jones, Most Secret War, (London: Penguin, 1978), 
pp.231-2
100  William Raymond Loomis, Fighting Firsts, (Guildford (UK): 
Vantage, 1958), p.268
101  Clayton Knight & Robert C. Durham, Hitch Your Wagon: 
The Story of Bernt Balchen, (Baltimore, MD: Bell Publishing 
Company, 1950), p.294
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and highly accurate report on the rocket and 
its capabilities by 26 August 1944.102 This and 
his interim reports, the first of which was sent 
to the Cabinet on 7 July,103 allowed the govern-
ment and military in Britain important time 
to prepare for offensive operations against 
the rocket and for the defence of the civilian 
population who were to be targeted by it.104 
The barrage began on 8 September,105 by which 
time new, deep shelters106 and protection from 
flooding in the event of a strike on the embank-
ments of the Thames had been constructed107, 
with many civilians also evacuated to the coun-
tryside.108
A great effort was then also made to capture 
the remaining German agents in Britain and 
turn them to working against Nazi Germany.109 
With the alternative of being shot, most com-
plied, feeding false information on where im-
pacts of rockets hitting Britain had taken place, 
leading to rocket trajectories being misdirected 
from their intended targets so that in total, 
of those targeted at London, the majority fell 
into the Thames Estuary or in the countryside 
102  Churchill Archives Centre, University of Cambridge: Papers 
and correspondence of Reginald Victor Jones 1911-1997 
(Archive Collection): Reference:
 GB 14 RVJO: R.V. Jones, Report for War Cabinet & Joint Chiefs 
of Staff Committee 26 August 1944, pp.1-5, from: https://
archiveshub.jisc.ac.uk/data/gb14-rvjo (accessed 21 June 
2019)
103  Churchill Archives Centre, University of Cambridge: Papers 
and correspondence of Reginald Victor Jones 1911-1997 
(Archive Collection)
 Reference: GB 14 RVJO: Report for War Cabinet & Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Committee 7 July 1944, (presented 8 July 
1944), pp.1-2, from: https://archiveshub.jisc.ac.uk/data/
gb14-rvjo (accessed 21 June 2019)
104  Martin Gilbert, Road to Victory: Winston S. Churchill 1941-
1945, (Kibworth (UK): Guild Publishing, 1989), p.969 
105  J.L. Hillard, “Military Thinking” in Military Review, Vol. 48; 
(Fort Leavenworth (KS): U.S. Army Command & General Staff 
College, November 1968), p.91
106  David Bownes, ‎Chris Nix & Siddy, Holloway Hidden London: 
Discovering the Forgotten Underground, (London: Yale 
University Press, 2019), p.33
107  “Clapham South Deep Tube Shelter and Surface – Building 
at Wandsworth Entrance, Balham Hill”, produced by Historic 
England, (London: Historic England, 22 October 1998), from: 
https://historicengland.org.uk › the-list › list-entry, (accessed 
21 April 2021)
108  Arthur Salusbury MacNalty, (UK Government Report): “The 
Civilian Health and Medical Services: The Ministry of Health 
Services; other Civilian Health and Medical Services; The 
Colonies; The Medical Services of the Ministry of Pensions; 
Public Health in Scotland. Public health in Northern Ireland”, 
(Vol. II); (London: HMSO, 1953), p.259
109  Frederick Ordway I & III & Mitchell R. Sharpe, The Rocket 
Team, (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1979), pp.467-468
around London.110 
Knowledge of the range of the rocket, pro-
vided by ADI’s analysis of the Bäckebo ver-
sion (c. two hundred miles) also allowed for 
greater and swifter accuracy in locating launch 
sites, fuel depots and the supply convoys that 
serviced them.111 The successes of the Allied 
air attacks on these targets were limited in 
their effectiveness, yet both the military and 
civil defence actions taken would not have 
been carried out as early, nor been as effective, 
had a physical example of the rocket not been 
investigated and brought to Britain. Abwehr 
were aware of the capture of the rocket by the 
British and attempts by both the German intel-
ligence agencies and the Luftwaffe to end the 
Scandinavian service by tracking and destroy-
ing its aircraft whilst in international air space 
were stepped up from the summer of 1944.
Counter-Measures
The types of aircraft chosen for 730 became 
ever more important as a result of increasing 
interception attempts after the Bäckebo inci-
dent. As well as often flying close to their full 
range, weather conditions were often danger-
ous – ice and wind were the greatest dangers in 
winter and in summer the long daylight hours 
and good visibility made the aircraft vulner-
able, both to interception or anti-aircraft fire. 
Furthermore, it emerged in December 1945, 
that Abwehr agents working at Bromma had 
informed the Luftwaffe of every wartime flight 
departing Bromma from late 1941.112
Abwehr appear to have lacked knowledge 
of the purpose of the BOAC flights to and 
from Bromma until early 1941; they may also 
have regarded them as non-threatening be-
cause they were so few in number. However, 
as Abwehr increased it presence at Bromma 
through 1941, the value of the flights and the 
advantages for Berlin in stopping them be-
came increasingly apparent. This resulted in 
110  R. V. Jones, Most Secret War, p.458
111  The National Archive (UK): Directorate of Intelligence 
(AIR 40/1-2467), (published compilation of reports and 
correspondence relating to UK air intelligence operations 
and associated agencies in period 1943-45): (London: Public 
Record Office, 1984), p.168
112  C. G. McKay, From Information to Intrigue: Studies in Secret 
Service, (Abingdon (UK): Routledge, 1993) p.279
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the German legation threatening the Swedish 
government in 1941 that the Luftwaffe would 
shoot down BOAC aircraft if the Swedes al-
lowed flights to continue.113 Stockholm chose 
to largely ignore the threat, although tight 
restrictions on the number of flights remained 
in place until 1943. Furthermore, until 1942 
Bromma was the only airport open to BOAC 
flights, with a strict flight path designated by 
the Swedish civil aviation authority. However, 
the fact that no aircraft were lost to shoot 
downs until 1943, suggests that prior to this, 
the Luftwaffe did not have enough sound intel-
ligence on BOAC aircraft flight paths after they 
had left Swedish airspace, nor the capability to 
identify them accurately on radar. This would 
change definitively in late 1943.
As the threat to BOAC’s operations became 
more apparent, the nature of the aircraft used 
by the service changed, whilst the determina-
tion of the Luftwaffe command to stop them 
continued to become more manifest. German 
development of advanced radar tracking and 
the deployment of faster and more agile air-
craft to the southern Baltic region presented 
an ever greater threat, yet as BOAC’s on board 
technology improved, the dangers were mi-
113  Denis George Richards & Hilary Aidan St. George Saunders, 
Royal Air Force Official History): The Fight is Won, (London: 
HMSO, 1953), p.188
tigated. However, by early 1944, only the fast 
DeHavilland Mosquitoes were permitted to fly 
the southern route through the Skagerrak, with 
all other aircraft diverted to the northern route 
which passed over central Norway. 
By the end of the war, BOAC had lost eight 
aircraft, at least four of which were due to 
enemy interception, with three others probably 
due to this cause. The Focke-Wulf 190 fighter is 
thought to have been the most likely success-
ful interceptor in most cases, although the 
presence of Me109 fighters in the region and 
a small number of Me262 jets stationed in eas-
tern Denmark creates the possibility that they 
may have also have been responsible for some 
losses. The presence of floating anti-aircraft 
platforms in the Skagerrak added further to the 
perils faced by the BOAC pilots. 
Conclusion
The BOAC Scandinavian Service, which ran be-
tween 1939 and 1945, provided an internation-
al civilian air service crewed by Norwegian and 
British personnel throughout the Second World 
War. The service proved to be of importance 
to the Allied cause in terms of diplomacy, war 
industries and intelligence. It operated success-
fully, due to the close co-operation between 
A BOAC DeHavilland DH.98 Mosquito at Leuchars, c.1943
For a time, the Mosquito was the fastest operational aircraft in the world and formed the core of the 
BOAC Scandinavian service from 1943 to 1945.  Eventually, twelve of these much-in-demand aircraft 
flew on the Scandinavian service, demonstrating how important it had become to the Allied cause.
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the UK and Norwegian governments and vari-
ous departments within both administrations 
in facilitating it and ensuring its continuance 
against the great challenges of the Luftwaffe, 
the Nordic weather and the demands of the 
RAF for both aircraft and staff. The growing co-
operation of Stockholm in allowing expansion 
of flight numbers after 1940 was also of great 
importance.
The roots of the service lay in attempts 
during the early inter-war period by both the 
British, Norwegian and other Nordic govern-
ments to establish regular mail and passenger 
services across the Baltic and North Seas and 
also partly for the purpose of competing with 
the development of such services between 
Germany and Scandinavia in the same period.
Regular UK-Scandinavia passenger servi-
ces were added to existing mail services in 
1936, thus creating greater scope for a diplo-
matic and intelligence air conduit. With this 
partly in mind, BOAC was established by Act of 
Parliament in early 1939, resulting in the mer-
ging of the two main UK couriers, after which 
the new publically company operated primarily 
as a diplomatic and intelligence route for the 
next two years, albeit intermittently.
The Norwegian contribution to the staffing 
of the service began at the end of 1940 when 
a chronic shortage of pilots in Britain was so-
mewhat ameliorated by the first graduating 
aircrew from the RAF training base in Ontario, 
Canada, known as “Little Norway”, some of 
which were seconded to BOAC’s service becau-
se of their knowledge and experience of flying 
in Nordic weather.
By 1943 Norwegians made up half the 
service’s air crew from a total complement of 
around one hundred. Increasing numbers of 
ground crew and signals staff added further 
to BOAC’s Norwegian contingent thus easing 
the severity of the staff shortages the company 
continued to face. However, the leadership of 
the service, particularly at political level was 
not always amicable; the differing priorities  
of the Norwegian and British governments led 
to complaints from the Norwegian Air Force 
Command that despite their paying for many  
of the aircraft and providing half of the air 
crew, the priorities of the Norwegian govern-
ment - firstly that of transporting refugees to 
Britain and secondly, diplomatic carriage, were 
often ignored. There were also concerns over 
the level of control the Air Ministry exerted 
over the Norwegian Purchasing Board (an 
agency of the NGE) as it negotiated for the buy-
ing of aircraft from the United States. However, 
most of these disputes had been resolved by 
early 1944, although only after interventions 
by Churchill and King Haakon VII.
Arguably, the single most important part 
of the service’s responsibilities was the trans-
port of steel ball bearings (produced by SKF) 
to Britain from Sweden. Not only did this pro-
vide a regular supply to British war industries, 
which was not possible by sea, but also denied 
the equally vital supplies to Hitler, thus making 
production of new and advanced weapons for 
the Third Reich far more difficult than would 
otherwise have been the case.
Intelligence was also of great importance, 
particularly in relation to Milorg operations in 
Norway and to SOE and MI6 activity in relation 
to the development of ballistic missiles by Nazi 
Germany. The transport of physical intelligence 
and agents to Britain, particularly the Bäckebo 
rocket, enabled the Allies to develop counter-
measures against such weapons which had 
threatened to devastate cities in Britain, France 
and the Low Countries, as well as to further 
disrupt Allied preparations for the invasion of, 
and operations in Normandy in 1944.
The BOAC Scandinavian service came to 
encompass a series of major responsibilities 
for the Allies across a number of fields.  It de-
veloped from being a small, tenuous and much 
neglected courier service in 1939-40, to be-
come a broad and comprehensive air operation 
with responsibilities across a wide spectrum 
of Allied interests, including trade, intelligence, 
propaganda and humanitarian aid. It is an early 
example of the importance and success of a 
multi-national civilian air transport service 
being deployed to help facilitate the fulfilment 
of multiple nations’ economic, diplomatic and 
intelligence aims, as well as individual national 
priorities.
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